4A0-106 practice question 2 of 30

Which of the following about BGP loops in a VPRN environment is TRUE?

Full set: 214 questions
Answer options
A: Traditional BGP loop detection mechanisms are unable to detect a loop in a VPRN scenario.
B: BGP loops are detected in a VPRN when the customer has separate sites using the same BGP autonomous system number. Correct answer
C: The Nokia 7750 SR rejects routes containing AS_PATH loops by default.
D: When "remove-private" is configured at a PE, all routes received from the associated CE will have private AS numbers removed.
Correct Answer:
B. BGP loops are detected in a VPRN when the customer has separate sites using the same BGP autonomous system number.
Explanation

The standard BGP loop prevention mechanism relies on the ASPATH attribute; a BGP router rejects any route update where it sees its own Autonomous System (AS) number in the path. In a VPRN environment, it is common for a customer to use the same private AS number across multiple geographically separate sites. When a route from one customer site is advertised across the service provider's MP-BGP network to another of the customer's sites, the receiving Customer Edge (CE) router will see its own AS number in the ASPATH. Consequently, the CE router will drop the update, detecting a loop. This is the primary BGP loop challenge specific to VPRN architectures.

Why Incorrect

A. Traditional BGP loop detection (ASPATH check) functions correctly in a VPRN; it detects the customer's own AS in the path and drops the route as designed.
C. While this statement is true, it describes a general, default BGP behavior. Option B is more specific and accurately describes the VPRN scenario that triggers this behavior.
D. The remove-private command is applied to outbound BGP advertisements sent to a peer, not on routes received from a peer, to strip private AS numbers from the ASPATH.

References

1. Nokia 7750 SR OS Services Guide, Release 21.10.R1, "VPRN Services" Chapter, Section: "BGP AS Number Scenarios in a VPRN": This section explicitly details the scenario where a customer uses the same AS number at different sites. It states, "If the customer is using BGP to exchange routes with the service provider, it is possible that the customer is using the same AS number for all their sites. In this case, the BGP loop prevention mechanism will prevent the customer from learning their own routes from a remote site." This directly supports option B as the correct description of the issue. The document then introduces as-override and allow-as-in as solutions. (Document ID: 3HE 17484 AAAD TQZZA, Edition 01)

2. Nokia 7750 SR OS Routing Protocols Guide, Release 21.10.R1, "BGP" Chapter, Section: "Removing Private AS Numbers from the AS Path": This section describes the remove-private-as command. It clarifies its function: "When enabled, any private AS numbers are removed from the AS path of BGP routes that are advertised to an eBGP peer." This confirms the command is for outbound updates, invalidating the premise of option D. (Document ID: 3HE 17483 AAAD TQZZA, Edition 01)

3. RFC 4364, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)", Section 8: "Loop Prevention, Detection, and Mitigation": While not a Nokia-specific document, it is the foundational standard for this technology. Section 8.1 discusses the "AS Path Loop Prevention" issue when a customer uses the same AS at different sites, confirming that this is the standard problem scenario in BGP/MPLS VPNs. This provides the theoretical underpinning for option B.

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