ETHICS-IN-TECHNOLOGY practice question 3 of 15

During an investigation into a bank robbery, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) wants to monitor the telephone calls of identified suspects in…

Full set: 66 questions

Domain Cybersecurity and Cybercrime

During an investigation into a bank robbery, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) wants to monitor the telephone calls of identified suspects in the case for a two-week period. Due to the short time frame of the investigation, the FBI does not have time to pursue judicial authorization and get a warrant for surveillance. Which type of telephone calls is legal for the FBI to monitor under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FlSA). given the time frame of the investigation?
Answer options
A: Calls between two non-U.S. citizens Correct answer
B: Calls initiated by a U.S. citizen to a non-U.S. citizen
C: Calls initiated by a non-U.S. citizen to a U.S. citizen
D: Calls between two U.S. citizens
Correct Answer:
A. Calls between two non-U.S. citizens
Explanation

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) authorizes the government to conduct surveillance for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence. It is not intended for purely domestic criminal investigations like a typical bank robbery. However, assuming a foreign intelligence nexus exists in this scenario, FISA's provisions for surveillance without a traditional warrant, such as Section 702, are strictly limited. These provisions permit the targeting of non-U.S. persons who are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. Monitoring calls between two non-U.S. citizens is the only option that aligns with the primary scope of FISA's warrantless authorities, as the other options involve U.S. citizens who have significantly greater constitutional protections requiring judicial oversight.

Why Incorrect

B. Calls initiated by a U.S. citizen to a non-U.S. citizen: This is incorrect because FISA's warrantless provisions cannot be used to intentionally target a U.S. citizen for surveillance, regardless of who they are communicating with.
C. Calls initiated by a non-U.S. citizen to a U.S. citizen: This is incorrect for the same reason as option B. The involvement of a U.S. person as a party to the communication invokes higher legal protections.
D. Calls between two U.S. citizens: This is incorrect because surveillance targeting communications between two U.S. persons requires a warrant, typically under Title III for criminal cases or from the FISA court for intelligence cases. ---

References

1. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Reauthorization of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. CRS Report R47851 (December 11, 2023). On page 1, the report states, "Section 702 permits the government to acquire foreign intelligence information by targeting non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States." This supports that only non-U.S. persons are valid targets for this type of surveillance.

2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b). The statute itself specifies the limitations for surveillance under Section 702, stating that it may not be used to intentionally target a United States person or any person known to be within the United States. This statutory language directly invalidates options B, C, and D.

3. Brennan Center for Justice, NYU School of Law. "FISA's Section 702: The Basics." This resource explains, "Under Section 702, the government can only target non-Americans located abroad to collect foreign intelligence." This academic summary confirms that the legal authority for warrantless FISA surveillance is restricted to non-U.S. persons outside the country, making option A the only potentially valid choice under the law.

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